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  Designing policies to lower medical spending was central to the recent health care debate 
in the United States.  Rising health care costs are the leading contributor to projected federal 
deficits over the next few decades (Congressional Budget Office, 2009) and make health 
insurance coverage expansions difficult to afford.  In the private sector, high medical costs crowd 
out private coverage (Chernew, Cutler, and Keenan, 2005) and lead to reduced employment of 
low wage and secondary earners (Sood et al., 2009).   
  Of course, not all medical spending increases are problematic.  A good share of rising 
costs is attributable to the development and diffusion of new technologies (Newhouse, 1992), 
which bring significant value (Cutler and McClellan, 2001; Cutler, 2004).
1  In an efficient 
industry, spending more on a good is not a cause for concern. 
  But alongside valuable innovation is an enormous amount of inefficiency.  Evidence 
based on cross-sectional comparisons – both across countries and within the United States – 
suggest that one-third or more of medical resources is not buying improved health (Institute of 
Medicine, 2001; Cutler, 2002; Fisher et al., 2003a,b).  In a $2.5 trillion medical care economy, 
this amounts to over $700 billion of excess spending annually.  Understanding the causes of this 
inefficiency, and why it has not been eliminated, is the central goal of this paper.  
  One explanation for inefficient spending, common in the economic literature, is ‘flat of 
the curve’ medicine (Fuchs, 1974).  Low patient cost sharing combined with generous provider 
reimbursement means that neither patients nor providers have incentives to limit care.  Thus, too 
much is done.  Flat of the curve medicine is indeed common (see below).  But it is not the whole 
story.  There are two other explanations for excessive spending that are important as well.   
                                                 
1 Costs might also increase because of Baumol’s ‘cost disease,’ which would also be appropriate.  Medical care has 
a very high capital-labor ratio, though. 2 
 
  The second explanation is inadequate coordination of care.  Many acute conditions that 
could be prevented are not, leading to poor health outcomes and higher spending.  For example, 
about 20 percent of Medicare patients discharged from a hospital are rehospitalized within 30 
days (Jencks et al., 2009), often without seeing a doctor or nurse in between; in the best systems, 
the rate is as low as 6 percent.  Similarly, patients with chronic disease – hypertension, high 
cholesterol, diabetes, and depression, for example – are not helped adequately to control their 
condition.  Rates of chronic disease control are no better than two in five on average.  Inadequate 
care coordination costs lives, and likely dollars. 
  The third explanation for inefficiency is poorly designed production processes.  Medical 
care providers are far less efficient than they should be.  Doctors and nurses spend significant 
time on routine administrative tasks or clinical services that could be provided by less trained 
personnel.  Hospitals are slow to adopt efficiency savings in surgical suites, despite evidence that 
they save money and improve outcomes.  And mistakes are common and costly.   
  Medical care is complex, and it is natural that there will be inefficiencies in complex 
settings.  Indeed, in any industry where human action is important, there are bound to be 
mistakes. 
  The failure of medical care is not so much that mistakes are made, but rather that the 
system has not evolved mechanisms to minimize those mistakes.  For many years, Toyota was 
famous for its attention to error reduction; Wal-Mart is equally known for its supply-chain 
management.  In health care, in contrast, doctors will often redo a test because the prior test 
results are not available or would require too much effort to obtain.   
  The problem in health care is not a lack of possible market organizers.  Primary care 
physicians, for example, could coordinate care for patients with chronic disease.  Similarly, 3 
 
multi-speciality groups of physicians might combine into care organizations to make sure 
patients do not fall through the cracks.  Alternatively, payers for medical care – insurers or the 
employers they contract with – could push for coordination.  Even farther removed, a firm from 
outside medical care could enter health care and organize the care experience, as Amazon.com 
did with book sales and Expedia did with airline tickets.  A few firms have tried in health care, 
but none has made more than a minor dent.  The question is why. 
  I argue that there are two fundamental barriers to organizational innovation in health care.  
The first is the lack of good information on quality.  Within a market, it is difficult to tell which 
providers are high quality and which are low quality.  As a result, most consumers still rely on 
reputation to judge providers.  Difficulty measuring quality also makes expansion of high-quality 
firms more difficult.  The quality of a Wal-Mart store in Kansas is virtually identical to that of a 
Wal-Mart in Oklahoma.  Thus, a firm with a general reputation for high quality can expand 
nationally with relative ease.  Knowing that an insurer has high quality in California, however, 
tells consumers very little about its quality in other markets.  Thus, the gains from economies of 
scale are limited.   
  The second barrier is the stagnant compensation system of public insurance plans.  In 
most industries, higher quality is associated with higher prices.  That is not true in medical care, 
however, largely because of the public sector.  Medicare accounts for 25 percent of physician 
and hospital services, and Medicaid accounts for another 13 percent.  Since the 1960s, Medicare 
has paid providers on a fee-for-service basis, without reference to the quality of care delivered.  
Medicaid reimbursements are more flexible, but they are so low that many providers view 
Medicaid patients as effectively uninsured.  As a result, about 40 percent of the market transmits 
incentives to provide more care but not more efficient care (Medicare) or to avoid patients who 4 
 
are sick (Medicaid).  With so much of compensation pegged to volume, not value, inefficient 
care is the natural outcome.   
  If inadequate information and misaligned compensation systems are the problems, one set 
of solutions is in that arena as well.  I discuss the potential efficiency improvements from a 
significantly increased commitment to information collection and analysis, and changing the 
compensation arrangements in public insurance.   I show that such efforts could lower medical 
spending by significant amounts.  I discuss briefly how the recent reform legislation dealt with 
these issues.  I also discuss how issues such as capital constraints or the uncertain role of the 
consumer factor into this analysis.   
  The paper is organized as follows.  The first two sections provide evidence on the 
production inefficiencies in health care and the potential for improved outcomes.  The third 
section lays out the puzzle of missing innovation.  The fourth and fifth sections examine the 
barriers to innovation for providers and payers.  The sixth section notes the features of the recent 
reform legislation that affects these areas, and the last section concludes.   
 
I.  Productivity in Health Care 
  Inefficient spending is an example of low productivity; more is spent than is needed to 
get the outcomes we get (or equivalently, less output is produced than is possible given the 
inputs employed).  One way to gauge the relative efficiency of health care over time is thus to 
compare productivity growth in health care to other industries.   
  Productivity growth is notoriously difficult to measure in health care (Berndt et al., 2000).  
Accurate productivity assessment requires a good output measure.  Health is difficult to measure 
and even harder to decompose into medical and non-medial factors.  As a result, official data are 5 
 
much better on productivity outside of health care than they are in health care.
2  Still, I start with 
the official data as they are.   
  Overall productivity growth in the United States as a whole was low from the mid-1970s 
to the mid-1990s (the ‘productivity slowdown’).  Since the mid-1990s, however, productivity 
growth has increased rapidly.  Productivity growth in private industry, for example, was 1.25 
percent annually from 1987 to 1995 and 2.4 percent between 1995 and 2005 (Oliner et al., 2007).  
Oliner et al. attribute the resurgence of productivity growth largely to greater use of information 
technology.  Industries that use information technology above average experienced productivity 
growth approximately 1.5 percentage points higher than industries that did not.   
  The relative performance of productivity in different industries in the post-1995 era is 
shown in Figure 1.  The most productive industries were durable goods manufacturing (6.9 
percent growth annually) and information technology (5.7 percent growth annually).  These 
industries are fairly different from health care.  There are some industries with high productivity 
growth that are more similar to health care, however.  Retail trade, for example, used to be a 
cottage industry like health care.  In the last decade and a half, however, productivity growth in 
retail trade averaged 4.3 percent annually.  Professional and businesses services had productivity 
growth of 1.2 percent annually, another industry that is close in production to medical care.   
  Productivity growth in health care (along with education and social assistance) is 
estimated to be -0.2 percent annually in the official data.  As noted above, this is almost surely an 
underestimate.  But even still, the negative value is striking.   
  Other studies have looked more closely at health care costs and output, and can be used 
to assess the productivity of medical care over time.  Figure 2 shows the cost per additional year 
                                                 
2 Output assessment is difficult in other industries too, but the methodology to make quality adjustment is better 
developed.  Hedonic analysis is used in most industries.  In health care, however, the absence of good market signals 
makes hedonic analysis very difficult to employ. 6 
 
of life attributable to medical care between 1960 and 2000, as estimated by Cutler et al. (2006).  
The lower line is for newborns, with higher lines reflecting people at older ages.  The highest 
line is for people age 65.   
  The value of a year of life is generally taken to be about $100,000 (Cutler, 2004).  Thus, 
costs per year of life below this amount are generally considered to be good value, while costs 
above this amount are considered to be poor value.  Most of the estimates of cost per year of life 
are below $100,000.  Thus, medical care on average is giving good value for the dollar.  But the 
trend is adverse.  Cost per year of additional life was lower in the 1960s and 1970s than in the 
1980s and 1990s.  For the elderly, recent estimates suggest that we are spending too much to 
extend life, though these estimates do not account for quality of life.   
  At one level, the pattern of increasing cost per year of life is not entirely surprising.  It 
may be that the most beneficial treatments were developed first, and we are simply moving down 
the marginal product of innovation curve.  Looked at a different way, however, the finding is 
quite surprising.  In other industries, the common denominator has not been new goods but better 
ways of organizing production, distribution, and sales.  This organizational change has led to 
expanded output per dollar.  In health care, however, there has been very little innovation in the 
organization of the system.   
 
II.  Categories of Inefficiency in Medical Care  
  The inefficiency of medical care production can be understood in three dimensions: flat 
of the curve medicine; poor coordination; and inefficient production processes.   
 
  Flat of the Curve Medicine 7 
 
  Significant evidence shows that many people receive more medical care than is 
appropriate for their condition, especially in acute settings.  Consider the treatment of localized 
prostate cancer (Perlroth et al., 2010).  Almost all elderly men have cancer of the prostate.  In 
many cases, however, the cancer grows slowly, and the person will die of something else before 
the cancer becomes fatal – or even clinically meaningful.  Thus, ‘watchful waiting’ is a common 
strategy.  In some cases, the cancer will grow rapidly and should be treated. However, it is not 
always clear whether a patient has a rapidly growing cancer or not. 
  There are a variety of different treatments for prostate cancer.  In addition to watchful 
waiting, men may receive radical prostatectomy (removal of the prostate), brachytherapy 
(radioactive implants in the prostate), external beam radiation therapy, and intensity-modulation 
radiation therapy.  Costs increase with the intensity of care.  Costs in the two years after 
diagnosis average about $50,000 for watchful waiting and radical prostatectomy,
3 about $68,000 
for brachytherapy, about $78,000 for external beam radiation therapy, and about $96,000 for 
intensity-modulated radiation therapy.    
  Some clinical evidence has examined the effectiveness of these different strategies.  The 
results suggest that the therapies are approximately equally efficacious in men aged 65 and older, 
the most common group diagnosed with localized prostate cancer.
4  In particular, there is no 
evidence that the newer and very expensive radiation therapies have better outcomes.  There is 
some evidence of adverse side effects with surgery – impotence and incontinence are common 
outcomes – making watchful waiting even more appropriate for many men.  
  Still, rates of invasive treatment remain high.  Only 42 percent of elderly men with 
prostate cancer receive watchful waiting.  One-third receive a radical prostatectomy, 15 percent 
                                                 
3 Watchful waiting is not lower cost because some men go on to receive active treatment in the two year window. 
4 In younger patients, there is more time for the cancer to metastasize, and hence treatment is more beneficial. 8 
 
receive brachytherapy, 1 percent receive external beam radiation therapy, and 5 percent receive 
intensity modulated radiation therapy.  A final 4 percent of patients receive a combination of 
intensive treatment – which has not even been explored in the literature.  Perlroth et al. (2010) 
conclude that savings of $1.7 to $3.0 billion annually would be realized by having all Medicare 
patients receive guideline-concordant care.   
  Patient preferences are not a major part of the variation in treatment.  Sommers et al. 
(2008) show that patients differ in their preferences for side effects and risks of metastatis, but 
these preferences do not predict the therapy a patient receives.  Rather, patients get referred to a 
particular type of specialist, and this specialist then recommends the therapy that they judge best.  
Thus, patients who see only a urologist most frequently undergo a radical prostatectomy, while 
patients seen by a radiation oncologist undergo some form of radiation.   
  The standard economic framework rationalizing this outcome is shown in Figure 3 (see 
Fuchs, 1974).  Potential output is shown by the concave production possibility frontier.  The 
marginal value of life is shown by the straight line, assumed constant over this interval.  The 
optimal point for society is for patients to receive care until the marginal value of care is equal to 
the marginal cost, shown by point A.   
  Most patients are insured, however, and physicians are often paid above marginal cost.  
Each of these factors provides incentives for additional care above what is optimal.  This is 
shown by point B in the figure.  If the production function is sufficiently flat, outcome 
differences between points A and B would be difficult to detect, even at very different treatment 
rates.  Point B is allocatively inefficient.  The care that is provided is technically correct, but is 
not appropriate. 9 
 
  Other countries appear to have less overused care than does the US.  Because of the 
tighter restrictions on overall supply, the number of procedures performed is lower elsewhere 
(Cutler, 2002).  Thus, it is natural to think of lower spending countries as occupying a point like 
A in comparison to the U.S., perhaps at point B. 
  The overall amount of money spent on allocatively inefficient care has been a subject of 
some debate.  Comparing different regions of the United States, Fisher et al. (2003 a,b) estimated 
that about 30 percent of medical care utilization in the Medicare population is associated with 
care that is not contributing to improved health.  Other studies suggest the number may be 
smaller (Elmendorf, 2009) or larger (other countries spend about half the US amount).  Table 1 
shows the estimate of 30 percent possible savings. 
  The flat of the curve model is undoubtedly part of the explanation for high medical 
spending, but it is unlikely to be the only important factor.  Around 1990, 22 percent of elderly 
patients with a heart attack who lived in the United States received either coronary bypass 
surgery or balloon angioplasty.  In Canada, the equivalent number was 2 percent.  Yet 30 day 
mortality after a heart attack was the same in the two countries (Tu et al., 1997).  It is implausible 
that the production frontier is this flat over such a large range.  There must be some other 
explanation for poor outcomes in the U.S. 
 
  Poor coordination 
  The second area of low productivity is poor coordination of care.  For many medical 
conditions, people need to see generalist and specialist physicians, receive periodic lab tests, take 
medications, and modify their behaviors.  This complex regimen is almost always left to the 10 
 
patient to plan and coordinate.  Many people are bad at this, however.  Partly as a result, people 
receive too little chronic and preventive care.   
  If prostate cancer is the poster child for overused care, diabetes care is the equivalent for 
coordination.  Diabetes is a chronic disease, requiring regular dietary and (often) 
pharmacological intervention, and testing for possible complications.
5  There are consensus 
guidelines for how frequently these should occur.   
  Figure 4 shows adherence to these recommendations in the United States and seven other 
developed countries.
6  Adherence to guideline recommendations is low.  Only 43 percent of 
diabetics in the United States receive recommended therapy.  The issue is not just lack of 
insurance.  The other countries shown have universal coverage, and yet the average success rate 
(46 percent) is no better.   
  Diabetes is not unique.  Only one-third of people with high blood pressure have their 
cholesterol under control (Cutler et al., 2008), and only one-quarter of those with high 
cholesterol are under control (Hyre et al., 2007).  Outcomes for patients with conditions such as 
depression are even worse.  Again, this appears similar in all countries.  Unlike excessive use of 
care with low value, poor chronic disease care management is a feature of all developed country 
medical systems. 
  It is possible to do better.  A number of integrated provider systems achieve outcomes on 
diabetes care that are far superior to the norm.  Beaulieu et al. (2006) study the case of diabetes 
management in HealthPartners, a staff model HMO in Minneapolis, MN.  In the mid-1990s, 
HealthPartners began a program to improve diabetic outcomes.  The plan worked with its 
                                                 
5 These include heart disease, retinopathy, kidney failure, and poor circulation to the extremities.   
6 The survey was conducted by the Commonwealth Fund in 2008 (Schoen et al., 2008) and sampled about 1,000 
individuals in each country.  The initial sample was people with chronic disease; the sample in figure 4 is the subset 
with diabetes. 11 
 
physicians to identify diabetic patients that had not received recommended screening and 
provided nurse case managers to call the patients.  Physicians were encouraged to start 
medication therapy in patients for whom diet and exercise were not sufficient.  Patients, in turn, 
were reminded to take their medications and receive recommended screenings. Individual and 
group sessions developed mechanisms for people to manage their disease, and nurse case 
managers helped as needed.  In the five years after this program was implemented, rates of high 
blood sugar fell in half and diabetes was brought under much better control.  HealthPartners is 
not unique.  Kaiser Permanente, an HMO with salaried doctors and (in many areas) fully owned 
hospitals, regularly ranks among the top insurers on the basis of quality, largely as a result of 
good chronic disease care. 
The successful examples are similar in many ways.  They all integrate care across 
different providers, by having providers in the same physical or virtual organization.  They pay 
physicians on a salary or productivity basis, not just fee-for-service payment.  Finally, they 
decentralize decision-making to encourage productivity. 
  The biggest problem for HealthPartners was that the economics did not work out well.  
The cost of the program was a few hundred dollars per diabetic patient.  Better diabetes control 
translates into fewer adverse events, but that comes a few years down the road.  The health plan 
feared that many patients would transfer to a new insurer before the benefits of prevention were 
noticeable.  Beaulieu et al. estimate that the ROI was favorable over a decade, but not by 
anywhere near the social value of the program.   
  The lack of coordination that is endemic to chronic disease care is noticed by consumers.  
Figure 5, also taken from the Commonwealth Fund survey, shows that 25 percent of Americans 
with chronic disease have had the experience of having records unavailable when needed, and 20 12 
 
percent have had a doctor order a repeat test.  Overall, 35 percent of Americans felt their time 
was wasted because of poor organization.  Other countries do somewhat better, with 25 percent 
of people citing such barriers on average.  But nowhere are people very happy. 
  Comparable data on perceptions of other industries are not available.  That is not an 
accident; consumers are rarely as poorly served in other industries as in medical care.  In making 
retirement savings decisions, for example, companies such as Fidelity and Vanguard automate 
the collection of money and its allocation.  Flight information is kept and stored electronically, 
for easy access throughout one’s trip.  And specialty stores in retail bring together different 
products, so consumers do not have to physically compare products from different suppliers.   
  To be sure, the retail model of organization has imperfections.  Electronics stores 
encourage people to choose more services than they need, and sell them overpriced insurance for 
what they buy (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2004).  The fees collected by mutual funds are far higher 
than a perfectly competitive market would suggest (Barber, Odean, and Zheng, 2005).  But still, 
these market organizers have gained enormous market share because of their service quality and 
low price.   
  The low level of service quality in health care is ironic given the enormous investment in 
non-clinical personnel.  There are 9 times more clerical workers in health care than there are 
physicians, and twice as many clerical workers as registered nurses.  This investment has not 
paid off in superior outcomes or better customer service, however. 
  Better preventive care would improve outcomes, though whether it would save money is 
unclear.  In the medium-term, managing diabetics better reduces rates of heart attack and kidney 
failure, lowering spending.  However, everyone ultimately gets sick, and the lifetime costs of 
treating diabetics may be greater than if they were not treated.  Thus, lifetime medical spending 13 
 
may rise or fall, even as total productivity increases.  In light of the uncertainty about cost 
savings from prevention, I do not assign a dollar amount of cost reduction to improvements in 
this area. 
 
 Inefficient  production 
  The final aspect of low productivity is excessive costs of providing services. Like the 
problem of poor coordination, excessive input costs are a problem of productive efficiency.  A 
country with inefficient production would be at point C in figure 3.   
  Every analysis of medical care that has been done highlights the significant waste of 
resources in providing care.  Consider a few examples: one study found that physicians spent on 
average of 142 hours annually interacting with health plans, at an estimated cost to practices of 
$68,274 per physician (Casalino et al., 2009).  Another study found that 35 percent of nurses’ 
time in medical/surgical units of hospitals was spent on documentation (Hendrich et al., 2008); 
patient care was far smaller.   
  Half or more of this spending could be easily reduced through current or likely future IT 
systems.  For example, a segment of administrative costs are attributable to pharmacy and 
formulary-related interactions; these costs could be virtually eliminated through administrative 
simplification that can accompany ubiquitous use of IT (Gans, 2004). Another part of costs is 
associated with basic data entry: recording and transcribing notes, and inputting laboratory and 
physiological measures into systems.  Advances in voice recognition and computerized ways of 
transmitting patient vital status into medical records would reduce these costs.  As but one 
example, Kaiser Permanente found that use of IT combined with organizational changes led to a 
35 minute reduction in nursing overlap time associated with shift changes. 14 
 
  Surgical care is also less efficient than need be.  A variety of studies show that providing 
dedicated surgical suites for particular operations results in lower cost per surgery (Herzlinger, 
1997).  Yet, most full-service hospitals do not organize their operating suites in this fashion.  As 
a result, surgery costs more than need be. 
  Many of the examples just presented are of excessive cost for the same clinical benefit.  
In some cases, inefficient production also leads to worse outcomes.  This is most common in the 
case of medical errors – the poster child for inefficient care delivery.  It is estimated four percent 
of hospitalized patients suffer an adverse event, of which one-third, or 1 percent of total hospital 
admissions, are a result of negligence (Brennan et al., 1991).  The Institute of Medicine estimates 
that preventable medical errors lead to between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths annually, making such 
errors one of the top 10 leading causes of death (Institute of Medicine, 2000).  Errors are also 
expensive; costing the system about $30 billion annually (Scott, 2009).   
  There are many models for reducing medical errors.  Adverse drug interactions can be 
virtually eliminated by computerized physician order entry systems, which cost roughly $8 
million each.  Yet, only 4 percent of hospitals have fully adopted such a system (Cutler, Feldman, 
and Horwitz, 2005).  Surgical complications can be reduced through organizational innovations 
such as surgical checklists (Haynes et al., 2009); use of checklists is relatively low, however.    
  A few organizations have become quality leaders.  For example, Virginia Mason Medical 
Center in Seattle committed itself to lean manufacturing principles in 2002.  Over the next 
several years, it focused on patient safety, care coordination, supply management, and nursing 
productivity.  Among the returns have been greater patient volume, reduced capital expenditure, 
and less use of temporary and contract nurses (Kaplan and Patterson, 2008).  Similarly, 15 
 
Thedacare in Northeastern Wisconsin cut costs by 5 percent in three years and improved quality 
by using tools of lean manufacturing (Toussaint, 2009).   
Perhaps the biggest transformation of all was the Veterans Administration.  Between 
1995 and 1999, the VA handled 24 percent more patients despite a budget increase of only 10 
percent (compared to 30 percent in the health care system overall).  The VA was able to do this 
through greater use of IT, greater local financial autonomy, and empowerment of regional 
managers (Oliver, 2007; Kizer and Adams, 2009).  
  Reducing inefficient operations would save significant amounts of money.  The 
PROMETHEUS payment model initiative estimates that 14-70 percent of costs for common 
conditions in the elderly (such as joint replacements, heart attacks, congestive heart failure and 
diabetes care) are avoidable (Gosfield, 2008).  Similarly, the VA and Virginia Mason examples 
suggest that a large share of total hospital costs are unnecessary.  If costs could be reduced by 
one-quarter – well in line iwht estimates of waste – total system savings would be about 8 
percent (see table 1). 
 
 
III.  Where are the Health Care Entrepreneurs? 
  The obvious question about health care is why the market has not evolved to become 
more efficient.  For example, specialized firms might enter to help individuals navigate the 
health care system, just as financial services firms do with money management.  Alternatively, 
new integrated insurance plans might develop, or existing ones could spread across the country.  
In still other cases, groups of providers could come together to enhance quality and lower costs, 
pocketing the savings as profits. 16 
 
  In many other industries, entry is a crucial feature of improved productivity.  Wal-Mart, 
Southwest Airlines, and Amazon.com were all responses to inefficiencies in supply – in retail, 
airlines, and book sales respectively.  What is different about health care? 
  The lack of organizational innovation is apparent in looking at the sources of health care 
wealth.  Table 2 shows the Forbes 400 richest Americans in the health care, pharmaceutical, and 
retail industries.  There are 11 health care entrepreneurs on the list, 4 from the pharmaceutical 
industry, and 21 from retail.  Nine of the 11 health care entrepreneurs made their money by 
inventing drugs or devices.  Only one person can plausibly claim to have made money by 
changing the organization of health care delivery -- Thomas Frist, Jr. who started HCA, a for-
profit hospital company.  The story is similar in pharmaceuticals.  Three people on the list 
invented new drugs; only one figured out how to produce existing drugs cheaper (the generic 
market).   
  Contrast health care with retailing.  Not a single individual on the retailing list made their 
money by inventing a product that consumers use.  Instead, all of the people made their money 
by changing the way that consumers buy products.  This includes Wal-Mart (five heirs to the 
Wal-Mart fortune are on the list) as well as consumer products retailers Gap, Home Depot, 
Urban Outfitters, and Hobby Lobby.  Total wealth on the retail list is over $100 bllion. 
  The potential savings from improved organization in health care are enough to land many 
potential entrepreneurs on the Forbes 400 list.  Suppose that a firm developed and sold a system 
to improve hospital productivity, and as a result could save half of the 8 percent of medical 
spending estimated to be accounted for by productive inefficiency.  The money saved would 
total $100 billion annually.  Similarly, a firm that was able to reduce the overuse of care by even 17 
 
a quarter would save the health system $330 billion annually, again providing an enormous profit 
opportunity.  
  One irony of health care is that there have been attempts at organizational change over 
time, but they have not been successful.  Since 1980, Kaiser Permanente has attempted to enter 
seven new markets (Ho, 2008).  In four of those markets (Dallas, Kansas City, North Carolina, 
and the Northeast), Kaiser failed and withdrew.  In the other three, Kaiser’s market share 
averages 10 percent (10 percent in Atlanta, 3 percent in Baltimore, and 18 percent in Washington, 
D.C.), well below the 30 percent penetration in its base markets. 
  In another example, specialized firms have entered health care attempting to manage 
chronic disease – the ‘disease management’ industry.  Disease management firms were popular 
for a while, but have had only limited success.  External management of behavioral health care 
(mental health and substance abuse, primarily) has been very successful, but management of 
more common chronic conditions such as diabetes has been less successful (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2004).  As a result, the disease management industry has remained relatively 
small. 
  In the next sections, I consider a number of possible explanations for why organizational 
innovation has not come to health care.  I do this primarily using the three examples above: 
reducing use of care for patients with prostate cancer; coordinating care for diabetics; and 
eliminating mistakes in hospitals. 
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III. Provider-Driven  Reform 
  Many of the investments in clinical quality improvement need to occur at the provider 
level.  Hospitals and physicians need to adopt computer systems so that patient outcomes can be 
tracked and shared among relevant individuals.  Similarly, physicians need to counsel patients 
about treatment options.  And doctors need to be involved in care coordination.  Thus, it is 
natural to start with provider-level incentives. 
  To understand the economics of provider-driven reform, consider the standard profit 
equation.  Profits are total revenue (price, P times quantity, Q) minus cost: 
 
 P r o f i t   =   P * Q   –   C o s t          ( 1 )  
 
For organizational innovation to be effective, it must positively affect the price or quantity of 
services sold, or reduce costs.  I consider how improved quality would affect each of these areas.   
 
 Inefficient  Production.  Hospitals that invest in computer systems can reduce adverse 
drug interactions and thus lower treatment costs.  Reconfiguring surgical suites can lower 
surgical costs.  What is the economics of these investments?   
  Almost all of these interventions require up-front investment – either monetary or 
organizational.  Computer systems run into the millions of dollars, and changing operating 
practices involves re-organizing care throughout the institution.  Thus, provider groups need 
some return to make these investments.   
  Price changes are not a part of a favorable return.  Hospitals are typically paid on a fixed 
fee basis, independent of quality.  For example, Medicare reimburses hospitals a predetermined 19 
 
amount per stay, depending on the diagnosis of the patient and whether surgery was performed.
7  
A less good job earns as much as a better job.  Building off Medicare, private insurers generally 
use per-stay or per-diem payments: a single payment is made for all services provided in that 
stay or during that day, again independent of quality.  As a result, improved quality merits no 
higher price.   
  Quantity responses to quality improvements are also limited.  One might imagine that 
more patients would choose to be operated on in hospitals with safety systems or more regular 
surgical times.   But information about such forms of quality is not systematically available.  
Until very recently, there were no validated measures of provider quality that accurately 
accounted for differences in patient severity.  And even now, measures of clinical and service 
quality are extremely limited.  As a result, hospital choice is based on reputation or 
recommendation more than actual data.   
  That leaves only the possibility of cost savings.  Many productivity innovations will 
reduce costs.  Fewer errors means shorter hospital stays, for example, which lower costs.  A full 
analysis of investment in more efficient production has not been undertaken, and it may be that 
providers should be investing in efficiency improvements on this basis alone.  To date, however, 
the vast bulk of hospitals have concluded that the financial and organizational costs of 
transforming their institution are not matched by sufficient cost savings.   
  An example is telling.  In the 1990s, Cincinnati Children’s Hospital decided it wanted to 
become a leader in quality of pediatric care (Edmonson and Tucker, 2009).  The hospital CEO 
and Board of Directors were on board, but the finance team was not.  They saw quality 
improvement as harming the finances of the institution, which were based on admitting more 
                                                 
7 The exception to the fixed payment is that very costly outliers are reimbursed an additional amount above the per-
stay payment. 20 
 
children and treating them in a high-tech way.  No payer reimbursed them more for higher 
quality care; in fact, it was penalized.   
  In the end, the finance team was brought along, but only by pointing out an error in their 
thinking: having fewer medical errors meant more rapid discharges, which could be offset by 
admitting more patients from the queue.  Thus, there would be no revenue loss from better care.  
After demonstrating that revenues would not be harmed, the staff at Cincinnati Children’s 
Hospital went ahead with the quality improvement efforts, and Cincinnati Children’s Hospital is 
now a model for other institutions.  The example of Cincinnati Children’s would apply at similar 
prestigious institutions, but not in all of American medicine.  For most providers, quality 
improvement is unlikely to have a positive ROI. 
 
  Care Provision: Limiting and Managing Care.  Limiting excessive care provision and 
better managing patients with chronic disease have many similarities.  In each case, physicians or 
nurses expend effort – counseling the patient about treatment options in the case of prostate 
cancer and explaining the steps involved in good management in the case of diabetes.  A 
successful intervention then lowers downstream costs.  We can thus analyze these two examples 
together. 
  From the physicians’ perspective, the pricing of medical care makes the switch from 
invasive medical procedures to advising and counseling problematic.  Most physicians are paid 
on a fee-for-service basis.  For example, Medicare uses fee-for-service payment for all 
physicians.  The service units are independent activities that a physician performs when seeing a 
patient: a routine office visit, a procedure, or an interpretation of an image.  Quality is not a part 
of the calculated fee.  Rather, it is based on intensity: procedures are valued much higher than 21 
 
counseling.  Thus, primary care physicians earn about $190,000 per year, while many specialists 
earn double that amount (Medical Group Management Association, 2009).  Further, many of the 
simple services that are involved in good chronic care management are not reimbursed at all.  
There is no billing code for e-mail interaction, nor is there any payment for having a nurse place 
a reminder call to a patient.  As a result, care management yields among the lowest returns. 
  Quantity changes are also not conducive to higher quality.  Many providers have a 
waiting list of patients, so attracting more patients is not a major concern.  Those providers that 
are not full compete on quality, but quality is again difficult to measure.   
  Coupled with this financial disincentive is the traditional norm that separates the practice 
of medicine in a medical setting from social interventions.  Doctors are trained to diagnose and 
treat patients.  They are not trained to counsel or reach out to patients.  Physicians can be made 
to see their job differently, but the incentives to change need to be very strong.  In the current 
system, these incentives are weak, if present at all.  With a relatively inelastic quantity, and 
prices that are invariant to quality, the incentives for providers to invest in more efficient care 
provision are very substantially blunted.   
 
IV. Payer-Driven  Innovation 
  Given the poor incentives transmitted to medical care providers, the obvious question is 
why payers do not intervene.  Payers for medical care could significantly affect the productivity 
of the system.  For example, payers could ensure the flow of appropriate information by 
requiring providers to adopt and use interoperable electronic medical records.  They could also 
move to quality-based payment systems to incentivize more efficient care.   22 
 
  The ‘payers’ here include insurers, the employers who contract with them, or third firms 
that purchase and manage the care from individual providers (for example, a multispecialty 
practice or an oncology care management company).  Why do they not do so?  Four explanations 
have been proposed.   
 
  Network externalities.  The first explanation for lack of insurer change is network 
externalities – a single payer finds it difficult to have compensation arrangements that are 
substantially different from other payers.  Medicare and Medicaid together account for about 40 
percent of acute care payments, and private insurance is another 40 percent.
8  Within the private 
insurance market, there might be three or four large insurers, for an average market share by each 
plan of about 10 percent.  It is difficult for an insurer to fundamentally change the practice of 
medicine when it accounts for only 10 percent of the market.  For example, even an insurer that 
put 20 percent of a physician’s revenue at risk for poor performance would affect only 2 percent 
of the typical provider’s income.  Given the fixed cost associated with provider change, this 
incentive system is unlikely to do much good.   
  The economics are even worse for large firms.  A large firm accounts for a smaller share 
of the total market, making it difficult for a self-insured firm to affect medical practice to any 
great extent.  This is why most of the employer-led innovations have involved the combined 
effort of many large firms in an area – and usually only areas with a significant presence of 
employment in large firms. 
  Further, because of the fixed costs of providers changing their practice, even if the insurer 
were able to change provider behavior, the savings would be realized by all payers.  A primary 
                                                 
8 The remaining 20 percent is from other payers, including worker’s compensation, the VA, public health agencies, 
and out-of-pocket payments.  Out-of-pocket payments track public and private methodologies. 23 
 
care physician that responds to insurer incentives by hiring a nurse case manager to work with 
diabetic patients will have that nurse case manager work with all patents, not just those of a 
particular insurer.  Thus, the benefits of any insurer investing in better care extend well beyond 
that insurer.
9 
  Two solutions are generally available for solving the network problem.  First, integrated 
firms may arise that provide both insurance and medical care and thus internalize all externalities.  
Kaiser is an example of such a firm, and it provides among the highest quality chronic disease 
care.  Like most high quality firms in health care – Geisinger Health Care, the Mayo Clinic, and 
the like – Kaiser has walled themselves off from the rest of the health system.   
  Alternatively, providers could decide to propose new contracts.  For example, providers 
might suggest that cost savings that result from fewer hospital-based errors be shared between 
the innovating firm and the government.  The major problem here is Medicare.  Medicare 
reimbursement has been fixed by law, making that part of revenue unalterable. 
 
  Information.  The second barrier to expansion of high quality care is lack of good 
information.   Return to the example of Kaiser health plan, where expansion met with only 
haphazard success.  Analyzing the Kaiser experience, Ho (2008) argues that lack of good 
information was a central barrier: outside of its traditional area, people did not have direct 
experience with Kaiser and so did not automatically associate it with high quality. 
                                                 
9 This situation is not unique to health care.  In the automobile industry, there was a lengthy debate about the make-
or-buy decision: should an automobile company make its own spark plugs (and tires, batteries, etc.), thus reaping all 
the benefits of innovation, or should it purchase components from external firms, with attendant spillovers to other 
purchasers?  In the end, automobile firms chose to purchase, not produce, components.  Separate firms made and 
innovated in automobile components.  In the automobile case, prices were flexible enough that component suppliers 
continued to innovate.   24 
 
  Within a market, lack of good quality data means that consumers have a difficult time 
determining which providers are better and worse.  And across markets, lack of good information 
means that firms with high quality in one geographic area will not necessarily be perceived to 
have high quality in other areas.   
  The difficulty of measuring quality is a fundamental difference between health care and 
most other retail products.  Retail stores can be virtually identical across the country, allowing 
firms can earn a national reputation for high (or low) quality relatively easily.  In health care, 
national reputations are uncommon.   
  The information problem in health care is very much a public good.  All insurers would 
like to have good data on physician quality, but no single insurer has an incentive to create such 
data, since quality information will rapidly disseminate across the market.  Thus, some 
governmental involvement in information is needed.   
 
  Plan Turnover.  Suppose that an insurer decides to coordinate care on its own.  It might 
hire nurse case managers, work directly with patients, and reconcile different physician 
recommendations.  What is to stop it from realizing the benefits of this strategy? 
  High plan turnover is one often-cited barrier (Cebul et al., 2010).  Investing in better care 
has up-front costs, but many of the savings occur only over time.  For example, better diabetes 
care may lead to fewer complications, but only after five to ten years.  Since as many as 20 
percent of people change plans annually, the insurer undertaking the original investment may not 
realize the savings.   
  That said, this explanation is not entirely convincing.  The high turnover in health 
insurance is partly endogenous – customers feel little allegiance to a plan whose perceived 25 
 
quality is low and whose services are comparable to those of every other insurer.  In plans with a 
reputation for good quality – Kaiser Permanente in California, for example – turnover is much 
lower.  Thus, I suspect this explanation for lack of investment in organizational change is less 
important than it might seem. 
 
  The Wrong Customer.   The issue of turnover raises a general question about who is the 
appropriate customer when payers consider care management.  In retail trade, the customer is the 
individual shopper.  If Wal-Mart finds a way to save money, it can pass that along to consumers 
directly.  In health care, in contrast, the situation is more complex, since patients do not pay 
much of the bill out-of-pocket.  Rather, costs are passed from providers to insurers to employers 
(generally) and on to workers as a whole.   
  If this process is efficient, the system will act as if the individual is the real customer, 
since they are ultimately paying the bill.  It may be, however, that the incentives get lost in the 
process, and efforts to innovate are not sufficiently rewarded.   
  What difference does selling to an employer or selling to an individual make?  Even if 
insurers wrongly think their customer is the employer purchasing insurance, that employer may 
still value improved quality.  Many firms, for example, invest in wellness programs, which often 
involve attempts to coordinate care.  If cost savings or productivity benefits of improved health 
are sufficiently high, this is a natural step for employers.  The impact of group versus individual 
purchase is thus a matter of some debate. 
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V.  The Impact of Recent Legislation 
  This analysis has highlighted two fundamental factors leading to low health care 
productivity: lack of good information on quality of care, and public sector payment systems that 
are insufficiently responsive to the value of care provided.   It follows that making health care 
more efficient will require changes in each of these areas.   
  There has recently been a push to gather relevant information and measure the quality of 
different providers.  For example, many states now profile cardiovascular surgeons, based on 
criteria developed by the surgeons themselves; the Federal government has produced data on 
hospital quality from Medicare records; and non-profit groups are standardizing measures of 
good care for different specialties.  The report card movement has generated some successes, but 
also controversy.  Providers with low ratings seem to improve when the low quality of their care 
is identified publicly (Cutler, Huckman, and Landrum, 2003), but part of this may be because 
they avoid sicker patients (Dranove et al., 2004).  It is not clear how extensive this practice is, or 
whether better risk adjustment would improve the situation. 
  The key barrier to more widespread quality assessment is access to appropriate data.  
Having high-quality measures of performance requires detailed information from medical 
records, but these data are generally not computerized or centrally stored.  
  Recent legislation may change this.  As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, the federal government is committing $30 billion over the next five years to finance 
a national system of electronic medical records.  In addition, the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (a.k.a. the health reform legislation) mandates that Medicare data 
be made available to private parties, including insurers and employers, for purposes of forming 27 
 
quality measures.  Thus, we may be on the verge of significantly reducing the information 
problems in medical care. 
  The healthcare IT investment was generally applauded.  Debate was much fiercer about 
payment reform, however.  Broadly speaking there are three approaches to payment reform.  The 
first is a single payer system, where physicians are salaried or paid on a fee-for-service basis 
within an overall budget target.  Such a system is common in many countries, and can be 
successful in reducing unnecessary care.
10  The second approach is to turn health care into a 
market like other markets, where individuals are more in charge of their spending and service use.  
This would take the form of much higher deductibles in Medicare, and incentives to purchase 
less generous policies outside of Medicare.  The idea behind this model is that providers forced 
to compete for individuals would invest in higher quality, the same way that retail firms do.   
  The third approach is to keep cost sharing as it is, but to reform the way that Medicare 
payments operate, to stress value more than volume.  The theory underlying this is that changes 
in Medicare, integrated with changes in private reimbursement, will provide incentives for more 
efficient care delivery. 
  Following this third path, changes in Medicare reimbursement are a significant part of the 
recent reform legislation.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act introduced several 
types of payment alternatives to fee-for-service Medicare.   Bundled payments are payments 
made to a group of providers who jointly agree to care for a patient with a particular condition 
and split the overall amount.  Accountable care organizations go a step further – groups of 
providers agree to accept a capitation payment in exchange for providing all services needed 
during a year.  Pay-for-performance, or value-based purchasing, is a method of adjusting fee-for-
service payments to reflect the quality of the care provided.  Finally, care coordination and 
                                                 
10 Like any rationed system, the efficiency of a single payer system depends on how well the rationing is done. 28 
 
transition payments are introduced to provide support to nurses or primary care physicians that 
seek to manage care better.   
  Each of these payment systems have been the subject of experimentation, with some 
success in each case.  Payment bundles are the best developed.  Medicare’s Heart Bypass Center 
Demonstration Project in the 1990s bundled all care for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) 
surgeries; it achieved savings of more than 15 percent per episode (Cromwell et al., 1997).  
Similarly, Geisinger health system has a bundled system in place for cardiac care and has among 
the lowest rate of readmissions in the country (Casale et al., 2007).   
  The idea of global payments for a patient as a whole has been tested in the Medicare 
Physician Group Practice Demonstration (PGP).  The experiment has so far shown savings of 
$17 million, and 4 of the 10 sites exceeded the 2 percent savings threshold in the second year of 
the program, making them eligible for bonus payments (Tisolini et al., 2008; McCarthy, Mueller, 
and Klein, 2009; Praxel, 2008).   
  Many care coordination efforts are also promising.  In addition to the Group Practice 
Demonstration described above, Geisinger’s medical homes initiative saw 7 percent total 
medical cost savings and a significant reduction in hospital admissions in the first year (Paulus et 
al., 2008).  Similarly, a number of sites in the Medicare Coordinated Care Demonstration 
successfully contained costs by avoiding initial hospitalizations and rehospitalizations.  Overall 
coordination efforts appear to be able to save about 15 percent of inpatient costs when they target 
populations with chronic illnesses (Brown et al., 2009; Pekis et al., 2009).  
  Evidence on the impact of pay-for-performance is mixed, reflecting the paucity of large 
experiments using these methods and the focus of most programs on quality improvement, not 
cost efficiency (Peterson et al., 2006).  The documented improvement in quality that some 29 
 
programs achieve suggests that cost saving are feasible, however.  Overall, payment reform 
shows a good deal of promise as a complement to improved information.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
  Health care is notorious for market imperfections.  For a number of reasons, medical care 
markets do not always work well.  Within the plethora of health care problems, though, one 
problem sticks out: the mismatch between the medical care that people should get, and the care 
that they do get.  About one-third of medical spending is not associated with improved outcomes, 
significantly cutting the efficiency of the medical system and leading to enormous adverse 
effects.   
  To reduce this waste, organizational innovation will be required.  To date, however, such 
innovation has been very rare in health care.  This paper argues that lack of information and poor 
incentives are the key barriers to new organizational models, and accordingly that public action 
to address these issues is needed.  Recent reform legislation has made changes in each of these 
areas.  Whether the legislation addresses these problems sufficiently is something that only time 
will tell.   
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  Source: Oliner et al., 2007. 
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Note: PPF is the production possibility frontier and MVH is the marginal value of 
health.  Point A, where the two intersect, is the efficient equilibrium.  Point B is 
allocatively inefficient; the care is technically correct, but too many people are 
treated.  Point C is productively inefficient; health improvement is less than is 
possible given the amount spent.  
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  Note: The specific types of care asked about are: hemoglobin A1c checked in past six 
months; feet examined for sores or irritations in past year; eye exam for diabetes in past year; 
and cholesterol checked in past year.  
  Source: Commonwealth Fund 2008 International Health Policy Survey in Eight Countries. 
See Schoen et al., (2008). 
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  Note: The specific question is: “In the past 2 years, when getting care for a medical 
problem, was there ever a time when…?” 
  Source: Commonwealth Fund 2008 International Health Policy Survey in Eight Countries. 
See Schoen et al., (2008). 
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Table 1: Estimates of Inefficient Health Care Spending 
 
Category 
Share of medical 
spending 
Annual savings from 
50% reduction 
Flat of the curve medicine  30%  $350 billion 
Inadequate care coordination  ??  --- 
Productive inefficiency  8%  $100 billion 
Note: See text for sources. 
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Table 2: The Richest Americans in Health Care and Retailing 
Number Name 
Net Worth 
($billion) Source 
Health Care 
68  William Cook   $5.0  Cook Group (catheters, stents, etc.) 
123  Barbara Piasecka Johnson   $3.3  Johnson & Johnson 
134  Ronda Stryker   $3.0  Stryker (joints, surgical tools, etc.)  
215 Jon  Stryker    $2.1  Stryker 
246  Thomas Frist Jr.    $1.9  HCA  
262  Alfred Mann   $1.8  Minimed (insulin pumps)  
262 Pat  Stryker    $1.8  Stryker 
301  Patrick Ryan   $1.6  Re-insurance broker  
321  John Abele   $1.5  Boston Scientific  
321  Gary Michelson   $1.5  Karlin technology (spinal implants) 
355  John Brown   $1.4  Stryker 
 
Pharmaceuticals 
65  Patrick Soon-Shiong  $4.0  Generic drugs 
158  Philip Frost  $2.0  Kay Pharmaceuticals (OTC products) 
190  Michael Jaharis  $1.9  Kay Pharmaceuticals (OTC products) 
230  Randal J. Kirk  $1.6  New River Pharmaceuticals (Vyvanse)
 
Retailing 
---  5 heirs of Sam Walton  $81.9*  Wal-Mart 
44  Frederik Meijer & family  $5.0  Supermarkets 
44 John  Menard  $5.0 Menard’s   
---  3 heirs of Fishers  $3.3*  Gap 
97  Richard Schulze  $3.0  Best Buy 
117  E. Stanley Kroenke  $2.7  Real estate 
118  Victor Fung & Family  $2.6  Li & Fung (global outsourcing) 
123  David Green  $2.5  Hobby Lobby 
158 Roger  Wang  $2.0  Retail  in  China 
272  Bernard Marcus  $1.5  Home Depot 
272  Drayton McLane Jr.  $1.5  Wal-Mart (logistics) 
317  Arthur Blank  $1.3  Home Depot 
317  Richard Hayne  $1.3  Urban Outfitters 
366  Margaret Magerko  $1.1  84 Lumber 
371 William  Kellogg  $1.0  Kohl’s 
* Combined net worth 
Source: Forbes Magazine 
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